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Cet article compare la colonisation des terres marécageuses en Acadie et en France
au cours du 17e siècle. Il s’ouvre sur une analyse des raisons pour lesquelles les
premières tentatives en vue de coloniser les marais échouèrent. Il compare ensuite
les tentatives fructueuses effectuées plus tard à Port-Royal, en Acadie, et dans le
Marais poitevin, en France. Malgré les objectifs bien différents qu’ils poursuivaient
et les défis différents posés par l’environnement, les deux groupes organisèrent leurs
activités avec efficacité et firent preuve d’innovation en adaptant de vieilles
techniques. Ce qui fit la particularité de la culture des marais en Acadie, c’est sa
petite échelle et son caractère dispersé et décentralisé. Les deux initiatives
démontrent comment la colonisation des terres marécageuses était une entreprise
profondément locale.
This article compares marshland colonization in Acadia and France during the 17th
century.   It begins with an analysis of why  the initial attempts to colonize
marshlands failed.  It then compares the later, successful initiatives at Port Royal,
in Acadia, and the Poitevin Marsh, in France.   Although they had very different
objectives and tackled very different environmental challenges, both groups
effectively organized their activities and used innovation in adapting old techniques.
What made Acadian marshland farming distinctive was its small scale and its
dispersed, decentralized nature.   Both initiatives demonstrate how successful
marshland colonization was a profoundly local endeavour.
THE AUTHORS OF THE SUCCESSFUL 2011 SUBMISSION of Grand Pré as a
world heritage site noted that the Acadians “took European practices, developed for
wetlands and saltpans, and adapted them to the much different environment in
Acadie.”1 Yet there was also a larger context for marshland exploitation. Recent
work suggests that French, Dutch, and English colonists throughout northeastern
North America relied at least in part on marshlands. They were ideal as a place to
start because they were easily accessible and provided immediate food resources
such as fish and waterfowl as well as pasture for livestock. No doubt the colonists
1 World Heritage Nomination Proposal for Grand Pré (January 2011), 28. The author would like to
thank Jonathan Fowler, as well as the co-editors of Acadiensis and the anonymous reviewers
chosen by that journal for their comments and suggestions on this article. The research was funded
in part by a grant from the Faculté d’études supérieures et de la recherche (FESR) de l’Université
de Moncton.
Gregory Kennedy, “Marshland Colonization in Acadia and Poitou during the 17th
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were inspired in part by the example of the Aboriginal peoples, who used wetlands
in this way.2 Many colonists also saw marshes as potential places for agriculture
since major initiatives to drain and develop marshlands were already under way in
France, the Dutch Republic, and England. From an environmental perspective,
colonization of new lands in Europe was an essential dynamic of emerging capitalist
societies facing significant demographic pressures. In the New World, the
transformation of natural and Aboriginal landscapes by new colonial societies could
be even more dramatic.3 From a political and economic perspective, colonization
was central to the processes of state formation in Europe and empire building
abroad. For governments and elites looking to consolidate and expand their power
and wealth, New World and metropolitan affairs were not separate but intertwined.4
How, then, does Acadian use of marshlands fit into this larger history of
colonization in the Atlantic World?5 To what degree was the Acadian marshland
experience distinctive? This article seeks to address these questions by comparing
marshland colonization in Acadia and France during the 17th century. A few experts
have already made this link, setting the stage for a more thorough comparison.6 Two
exemplary models will be employed – Port Royal, the first and most important
Acadian community, and la Société de Petit-Poitou, the first successful company in
the Poitevin Marsh, in western France. Considered first will be the initial, failed
attempts to colonize these areas and what they reveal about the role of the state as
well as how these projects were connected to each other. The article will then
examine in detail the organization and the methods of the enduring colonies that
emerged in the 1640s and 1650s. Finally, the success of these colonies up to the
beginning of the 18th century will be evaluated.
The ambitions of Henri IV
While most historians have tended to pass quickly over France’s largely failed
efforts at building a colonial empire before 1610, recent studies have emphasized
that these projects were an integral part of the monarchy’s larger strategy to improve
France’s position in Europe and, perhaps, in the case of Henri IV, part of a larger
humanist vision that sought to create a better world after many years of brutal
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2 Matthew G. Hatvany, “The Origins of the Acadian Aboiteau: An Environmental-Historical
Geography of the Northeast,” Historical Geography 30 (2002): 123, 131.
3 John F. Richards, The Unending Frontier: An Environmental History of the Early Modern World
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 5-10.
4 The author would like to thank Helen Dewar for providing an advance copy of her forthcoming
article, “Sovereignty Overseas, Sovereignty at Home: The Role of New France in the
Consolidation of Maritime Authority in France, 1620-1628,” Revue d’histoire de l’Amérique
française LXIV (2012) (forthcoming).
5 In asking this question, I follow the lead of John G. Reid in his « Écrire l’Acadie en lien avec les
mondes atlantique et autochtone », in Martin Pâquet et Stéphane Savard, dir., Balises et
références, Acadies, francophonies, Québec, Presses de l’Université Laval, 2007, p. 256-260.
6 Karl Butzer, “French Wetland Agriculture in Atlantic Canada and Its European Roots: Different
Avenues to Historical Diffusion,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 92, no. 3
(September 2002): 451-70; A.J.B. Johnston, “Défricheurs d’eau: An Introduction to Acadian
Land Reclamation in a Comparative Context,” Material Culture Review 66 (Fall 2007): 32-42.
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religious civil war.7 France was clearly envious of the riches generated by its chief
rival – Spain – through its overseas colonies, as well as the success of the Verenigde
Oostindische Compagnie (VOC) – the Dutch East India Company.8 Nor were the
French entirely unsuccessful. Although permanent colonies had not been
established, the number of French cod-fishing vessels in the New World had
continued to grow and by the end of the 16th century may have rivalled the size of
the Spanish fleet in the Americas.9 This achievement owed much to the lucrative fur
trade with Aboriginal people that fishermen undertook while drying their catch.
Henri IV aimed to follow up on this success and focused colonization efforts on
the North Atlantic. Two modest expeditions set out in 1598 and 1599, one to Sable
Island and the other to Tadoussac; but by 1603 just 11 settlers remained at the
former, while only a small habitation and trading post had been founded at the
latter.10 A more ambitious project was launched in 1604 to establish Acadia. The
king granted a ten-year commercial monopoly to his friend and former comrade-in-
arms, the Protestant Pierre du Gua, Sieur de Mons, and further gave him wide
powers as his lieutenant-general to settle, trade, and enforce royal authority over all
of New France.11 De Mons was joined by Jean de Biencourt de Poutrincourt as well
as Samuel de Champlain, an experienced cartographer with an apparent close
connection to the king.12 During a disastrous first winter on the isolated, barren
island of Sainte-Croix, however, half of the colonists died of starvation and scurvy.
De Mons moved to the more sheltered harbour of Port Royal, where his surviving
men were able to construct a permanent habitation with the help and support of the
local Mi’kmaw community. Champlain experimented with a small marshland
garden, building a dyke, canals, and a sluice gate.13 Yet all of this seemed for naught
when, in 1607, rival merchants prevailed on the king to recall de Mons’s team.
Meanwhile, the Dutch also inspired Henry IV in another way. The extensive
reclaiming of low-lying areas for farms in the Netherlands had significantly
increased the food production and population of the republic. Drained marshlands
proved especially fertile and seemed to sustain that productivity for a long time
without the need for fertilizer or crop rotation. One later study in France determined
that they typically produced 10 to 30 per cent larger harvests than the best arable
land elsewhere.14 The marshes of western France had also seen some agricultural
development. Since medieval times, local monasteries and communities had
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7 Eric Thierry, La France de Henri IV en Amérique du Nord  : de la création de l’Acadie à la
fondation de Québec, Paris, Champion, 2008; David Hackett Fischer, Champlain’s Dream
(Toronto: Knopf Canada, 2008); N.E.S. Griffiths, From Migrant to Acadian: A North American
Border People, 1604-1755 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 3.
8 Niall Ferguson, The Ascent of Money (New York: Penguin Press, 2008), 128-39; Paul Butel, The
Atlantic, trans. Iain Hamilton Grant (London: Routledge, 1999), 63.
9 Thierry, La France de Henri IV, p. 16; Richards, The Unending Frontier, 555.
10 Thierry, La France de Henri IV, p. 53, 66.
11 « Lettres patentes expediez en faveur de Monsieur de Monts », 18 décembre 1603, Collection de
manuscrits contenant lettres, mémoires, et autres documents historiques relatifs à la Nouvelle-
France, I, Québec, Imprimerie A. Côté, 1883, p. 46.
12 Fischer, Champlain’s Dream, 42-7.
13 Fischer, Champlain’s Dream, 201-6; Griffiths, From Migrant to Acadian, 12-14; Butzer, “French
Wetland Agriculture,” 454.
14 Jean-Paul Billaud, Marais : rencontres de la terre et de l’eau, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1984, p. 54-55.
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constructed canals and dykes along their edges and used the reclaimed land to
pasture livestock. Coastal areas were also heavily exploited for salt production.
Much of this infrastructure, however, had been destroyed during the 16th-century
Wars of Religion, while the vast marsh interior was largely assumed to be
unproductive and disease-ridden. The few fishermen and gatherers who lived there
were scornfully referred to as “hut-dwellers.” The king had direct experience of the
Poitevin Marsh, having spent time hiding there during the civil wars. In 1586 he
wrote that they had great potential for development.15 Rather than simply restoring
salt and livestock production along the periphery, he aimed to drain the marshlands
in order to create productive farmland and new roads. The resulting grain production
and commerce would improve state revenue and security in the region.16
Here, as in New France, Henri IV launched an ambitious project. In 1599 the king
appointed a Dutch Protestant, Humphrey Bradley, as “maître des digues et canaux
du royaume,” with a mandate to drain and develop marshlands across France. The
king offered incentives such as exclusive rights to the cleared land and letters of
nobility for Bradley and his eleven principal associates. Yet the resulting “Grande
société de dessèchement” lacked the capital and the organization to get started. The
first constructions did not begin until 1607 and were fiercely opposed by most
seigneurs, who refused to give up their title to the marshlands. Meanwhile, local
inhabitants, motivated by xenophobia and fear that their traditional agricultural and
landholding practices would be disrupted, sabotaged the dykes at night.17
By the time that Henri IV was assassinated in 1610, the colonization projects in
Acadia and Poitou had both ground to a halt. They had been inspired by royal
ambitions to strengthen France in the image of its rivals, and led by royal favourites
given offices and privileges. But the king lacked the means to finance these projects
directly, nor could he force France’s elites to invest the funds necessary to capitalize
them. French merchants were prepared to invest in quick voyages that exploited the
New World’s natural resources, but seemed far less willing to risk their money either
in long-term settlement projects or in drainage schemes of unproven practicality of
which the immediate beneficiaries would be foreign investors like Bradley.
Colonization also required sustained political support, but even this the king could
not provide. Facing the unrelenting opposition to colonial schemes of his own chief
finance minister, the Duc de Sully, as well as the appeals of rivals for De Mons’s
trading privileges, the king recalled the expedition to Acadia after just three years.18
He also failed to counter elite opposition to Bradley’s project once construction
finally got under way. Henri IV could not override this opposition, or chose not to
do so, preferring to appease provincial interests.19 Political stability deteriorated
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15 Yannis Suire, Le Marais poitevin: une écohistoire du XVIe à l’aube du XXe siècle, La Roche-sur-
Yon, Centre vendéen de recherches historiques, 2006, 17.
16 Salvatore Ciriacono, Building on Water: Venice, Holland, and the Construction of the European
Landscape in Early Modern Times, trans. Jeremy Scott (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006), 209.
17 Suire, Le Marais poitevin, p. 56-57; Le Comte de Dienne, Histoire du dessèchement des lacs et
marais en France avant 1789, Paris, H. Champion, 1891, p. 35, 81.
18 Thierry, La France de Henri IV, p. 221; Fischer, Champlain’s Dream, 119.
19 Elizabeth Mancke and John G. Reid, “Elites, States, and the Imperial Contest for Acadia,” in John
G. Reid et al., The “Conquest” of Acadia, 1710: Imperial, Colonial and Aboriginal Constructions
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 34.
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after Henri IV’s assassination and during the subsequent regency of Marie de
Medici. Religious and political civil war now re-emerged, while a new expedition to
Port Royal was burned out by an English corsair and replaced by a group of Scots
colonists calling the region New Scotland (later known as Nova Scotia).20 In short,
neither domestic nor overseas colonization projects could rely on the state for the
sustained political and financial support that they required. Their future was very
much in doubt.
Continued war, instability, and elite competition
Early efforts at colonization had relied upon merchant associations: traditional
partnerships such as those led by De Mons and Bradley. Cardinal Richelieu, chief
minister to Louis XIII, is widely credited with renewing France’s efforts at
colonization – creating state-sponsored, joint-stock companies modeled after the
VOC that could bring together a larger investor base and manage colonies directly
on the government’s behalf. These organizations “allowed for the collection of large
amounts of capital, spread risk among numerous associates, and lessened the burden
on individuals of having funds locked up in infrastructure for several years.”21 The
principle of limited liability protected investors from claims against the rest of their
fortunes should the companies fail. The turning point is usually seen as 1627, when
Richelieu created the New France Company with one hundred initial shares.22
Richelieu’s plan, however, should also be seen in the light of his personal campaign
to defeat a formidable rival for the king’s favour, Henri II de Montmorency, Grand
Admiral of France. Montmorency’s patronage network, his purchasing of various
maritime offices, and his creation of companies such as that of Guillaume de Caen
to manage overseas ventures served as both model and threat to the new chief
minister.23 Until the so-called “Day of the Dupes,” in 1630, Richelieu’s position with
the king was far from certain. That most of the associates of the New France
Company were administrative and financial office-holders largely already under the
chief minister’s control24 may stem from his objective of using the company to serve
his own political interests rather than reflecting any failure to convince merchants to
invest. Elite rivalry and competition both at court and in the colony would continue
to destabilize Acadia’s development throughout the 17th century.25
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20 Suire, Le Marais poitevin, p. 57-59; Billaud, Marais Poitevin, p. 38; Griffiths, From Migrant to
Acadian, 23.
21 Dewar, “Sovereignty Overseas, Sovereignty at Home,” 14. Marcel Trudel characterized
Richelieu’s administration as a period of “sweeping reform” in The Beginnings of New France,
trans. Patricia Claxton (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973), 168.
22 « Articles accordez par le Roy à la compagnie du Canada », 29 avril 1627, et « Société de cent
personnes dont la dite compagnie est composée », 7 mai 1627, Collection de manuscrits, I, p. 64-
74; Gervais Carpin, Le Réseau du Canada: étude du mode migratoire de la France vers la
Nouvelle-France (1628-1662), Québec-Paris, Septentrion-Presses de l’Université Paris-Sorbonne,
2001, p. 133-139.
23 Dewar, “Sovereignty Overseas, Sovereignty at Home,” 18.
24 Lucien Campeau, Les finances publiques de la Nouvelle-France sous les Cent-Associés, 1632-
1665, Montréal, Éditions Bellarmin, 1975, p. 12-13. Trudel notes that only 26 of 107 of the
original associates were merchants or businessmen; see Trudel, Beginnings of New France, 171.
25 Mancke and Reid, “Elites, States, and the Imperial Contest for Acadia,” 43.
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France was also at war with England, while internal religious strife culminated in
the siege of the Huguenot stronghold of La Rochelle. Meanwhile, the first
expedition launched by the New France Company was captured by English
privateers. Only with the return of foreign and domestic peace in 1629, and the
return of Québec and Acadia in 1632, did a new French colonial expedition become
possible. Richelieu selected his cousin and naval war hero Isaac de Rasilly to lead a
group of 300 artisans, fishermen, and soldiers to re-establish Acadia.26 After
overseeing the departure of the remaining Scots at Port Royal, Rasilly chose to settle
at La Hève (a sheltered harbour on the east coast of Acadia). Did he plan to later
return to Port Royal and develop the marshlands there? The terms of a contract made
by his brother with salt-makers from France showed an intention to use the
marshlands to make salt, a key commodity for preserving fish. But it must soon have
become obvious that the limited sunshine and heat of Acadia’s climate would not
support salt production. Rasilly died suddenly in 1635, so it is difficult to
differentiate between his plans and those of his successor.27
Charles de Menou had served with Rasilly in the navy. After Rasilly’s death,
Menou moved most of the colonists to Port Royal and married one of the recent
arrivals – Jeanne Motin. He proceeded to direct all of his energies towards
establishing a feudal seigneury, complete with estates, a mill, and a church as well
as peasants from France. It seems most likely that the majority of the families
brought over by Menou came from the seigneurial lands of his family in Poitou and
Touraine; Rasilly had employed a similar strategy in his family’s holdings near
Bourgeuil and Chinon.28 Although few documents have survived from this period,
the clues we have indicate that the initial settlement at Port Royal was based on the
drainage of marshlands; the colonists, as tenant farmers, paid seigneurial dues and a
proportion of their produce in exchange for the land and tools to get started. One
eyewitness, the missionary priest Ignace, relates observing Menou out in the
marshes: surveying the land, planning dykes, and directing the work. Menou’s
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26 While the Dictionary of Canadian Biography and most historians of New France and Acadia
privilege the spelling “Razilly,” I prefer “Rasilly” because I found that spelling to occur most
frequently in references to that family in the parish registers and other documents of Poitou and
Touraine. See, for example, the baptismal register of the parish of La Chaussée Registres
paroissiaux, série 9E, 82/2, Archives départementales de la Vienne, Poitiers.
27 Engagements de Jehan Cendre et de Pierre Gaborit, 1 mars 1636 et liste de passagères du Saint-
Jehan, 1 avril 1636, série E, MG A2, Archives Départementales de la Charente-Maritime, La
Rochelle, at LAC; Griffiths, From Migrant to Acadian, 68. I am also indebted to Marc Lavoie and
Ronnie-Gilles LeBlanc for sharing their ideas on this issue.
28 Geneviève Massignon, « La seigneurie de Charles de Menou d’Aulnay, gouverneur de l’Acadie,
1635-50 », Revue d’histoire de l’Amérique française XVI, no 4 (mars 1963), p. 469-501; Nicole
T. Bujold et Maurice Caillebeau, Les origines françaises des premières familles acadiennes, le
sud loudunais, Poitiers, Imprimerie l’Union, 1979. Griffiths argues that the Acadians were more
broadly representative of various regions of  France; see Griffiths, From Migrant to Acadian, 65.
Carpin, in contrast, argues that Massignon’s theory remains the most likely; see Carpin, Le Réseau
du Canada, p. 260. Ronnie-Gilles LeBlanc provides a synopsis of the debate in « Les origines
françaises du peuple acadien avant 1714 » dans André Magord, (dir.), Le fait acadien en France :
histoire et temps présent, Poitiers/Moncton, Geste éditions/l’Institut d’études acadiennes,
Université de Moncton, 2010, p. 25-49.
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critics claimed that he treated his peasants like serfs.29 Still, the European population
of Acadia more than doubled from about 150 colonists and soldiers in 1640 to
perhaps 400 settlers 10 years later.
Menou also brought civil war to Acadia. He seized the assets of rival colonizers
Charles de la Tour and Nicolas Denys on the basis of his supposed claim to Rasilly’s
offices, provoking a conflict that lasted until 1647 – when Louis XIII recognized
him as sole seigneur and governor of all Acadia. Menou’s sudden death by drowning
in 1650 launched a new wave of fighting among old rivals and new claimants.
Matters were further complicated when an English naval attack on Port Royal in
1654 led to the re-establishment of Nova Scotia and to New Englanders pushing
French elites to the margins of Nova Scotia.30 From then until the arrival of a new
French government in 1670, the colonists were largely neglected by colonial
authorities of any kind.
In France, Louis XIII and Richelieu did not share Henri IV’s ambition to colonize
marshlands. The king had had to fight his way through the Poitevin Marsh to lay
siege to La Rochelle in 1627, and with the war finally over probably wished to have
done with the place. Richelieu had first-hand knowledge from his time as Bishop of
Luçon, but seems to have had a low opinion of the region. Nevertheless, a few
seigneurs saw the potential for marshland development. One of the largest projects
was in the Bas-Médoc, south of Poitou, where the Duc d’Épernon reached an
agreement with Tisman Gorris and his Flemish partners in 1633. In return for
granting a perpetual lease to his marshland in the Gironde, Épernon would receive
a larger than usual seigneurial rent and keep his right to collect dues on the sale or
exchange of the land (the lods et ventes). But again the project languished; at his
death in 1642, just one-quarter of the marshland had been drained.31 As with
Bradley’s group, the scale of the project was simply too large, the investment base
too small, and local opposition too great. Without greater resources and sustained
interest, even local drainage projects could not be achieved.
During this period, colonization was dependent on the energy and resources of a
few individuals, whether acting on their own or through royal patronage as well as
on how closely these projects were intertwined with their personal interests. The
emphasis was on short-term gain, prestige, and power rather than long-term
development. War and rivalry could derail the entire enterprise. Thus, it is hardly
surprising that colonization in Acadia and Poitou failed to thrive under Louis XIII.
Turning points
The turning point for colonization in both Acadia and Poitou came not from
government direction but private, local initiative. After the death of Menou in 1650
and the English “conquest” of Acadia in 1654, the few hundred colonists faced an
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29 Griffiths, From Migrant to Acadian, 54, 70, 97; « Concession accordée par Aulnay à Martin de
Chevery » , 20 mars 1649, in Jacques Vanderlinden, Le lieutenant civil et criminel : Mathieu de
Goutin, en Acadie française, 1688-1710, Moncton, Chaire d’études acadiennes, 2004, p. 266;
Butzer, “French Wetland Agriculture,” 455, 464-5.
30 Griffiths, From Migrant to Acadian, 57-63.
31 P. Massé, « Le dessèchement des marais du Bas-Médoc », Revue historique de Bordeaux et du
département de la Gironde 6, no1 (1957), p. 31.
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uncertain future. The English proved uninterested in colonizing the region; they
simply wanted to control the fishing banks and the fur trade.32 With the return of
French officials and the taking of censuses during the 1670s and 1680s, we get our
first look at how the colonists had persevered. They had dispersed from Port Royal
along the nearby river, draining marshlands and establishing small hameaux –
groups of three to five families.
While colonists left to their own devices carried out the drainage of marshlands
in Acadia, a group of local elites established their own company to lead colonization
in the Poitevin marsh. La Société de Petit-Poitou began in 1640 with an agreement
between Pierre Robert, élu of the élection of Fontenay-le-Comte, and the Bishop of
Maillezais.33 In exchange for a commitment to cultivate two-thirds of the drained
land, one-twelfth of the resulting produce, and a derisory 12 deniers of seigneurial
rent per journal (about 0.4 hectares), Robert gained “en toute propriété” the bishop’s
marshlands. The associates were also to ensure that the bishop’s tenant farmers were
not blocked from reaching their common pasture, which presumably alleviated some
local concerns.34 Next, Robert needed to seek out royal approval and for this task he
enlisted Pierre Siette, king’s engineer and geographer at La Rochelle. Siette must
have been known to Louis XIII, because he had been entrusted with the task of
dismantling the fortifications of La Rochelle in 1629. It seems that Siette was
convincing because in 1641 the king declared that he and his group would have
exclusive rights for developing marshland in Poitou, Aunis, and Saintonge, and that
they would enjoy 20-year tax exemptions on any land they drained.35
At first glance, it is hard to see how these developments were turning points toward
effective colonization. War and instability continued in Acadia, while the tax
exemptions and privileges awarded to the Petit-Poitou Company appear little different
from those provided to Bradley’s grande société. France remained mired in European
wars and internal conflicts, particularly during the Fronde. The difference proved to be
the strong organization of the new projects, with local groups learning from the past
to create something more durable and less dependent on direct state support.
Organization
The Acadian colonists virtually abandoned Port Royal, except as a trading centre.
When Governor François-Marie Perrot arrived in 1685, he noted that only ten
Acadian families lived in the town, and a census two years later found just 60 to 70
Acadians there as opposed to 450 in the wider area. By this time, some families had
moved even further away, to new marshland areas at Beaubassin and Grand Pré.36 In
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Oxford University Press, 1991), 11.
33 An élection was the basic tax district in most parts of early modern France, notably for the taille
or poll-tax. The élu was the lead civic official responsible for tax collection and other fiscal
matters in the district.
34 Dienne, Histoire du dessèchement, p. 83.
35 Déclaration du Roy contenant les privileges accordez pour le desseichement des marais des
Provinces de Poictou, Xaintonge & Aulnix, 4 mai 1641, F-21045 (23), Bibliothèque nationale de
France (BNF), Paris.
36 Brenda Dunn, A History of Port Royal/Annapolis Royal, 1605-1800 (Halifax: Nimbus 2004), 
31-4. For more on Grand Pré and Beaubassin, see Edith Tapie, « Les structures socio-
00156-02 Kennedy Article_Layout  2013-04-16  9:46 AM  Page 44
general, this dispersion seems a logical decision by the colonists that enabled them
to take advantage of the best and most easily accessible lands along the rivers first
and also provided a measure of protection from the fighting and tensions that were
centred on the fort at Port Royal.37
Organization into small family clusters was the key to both immediate subsistence
and long-term development because of the particular pattern of life course in the
colony, which we can discern from a study of the 1671 census.38 When Menou died in
1650, most of the colonists were in their thirties and forties – married couples with
young children. This meant that the children required care and were not yet old enough
to significantly help on the family farm. A single family would have had difficulty
building dykes and digging canals at the same time as gathering food, building shelter,
and care-giving. A group of families, however, could combine their labour, completing
the initial constructions required for the land to drain and begin desalination while also
helping each other hunt, fish and gather, plant gardens, look after livestock, and build
homes. They could focus on what they needed, and gradually drain additional land
with the help of adolescent labour. The dispersion ensured that there was room to
establish future generations in the immediate vicinity and avoided competition with
neighbours over local food sources and how to divide up the lands. As early as in the
1671 census, over half of the households were led by the children of the first colonists
– they had married, begun having children, and had livestock herds of their own.
Focusing on livestock was another important decision of the colonists. The
census enumerated 66 households with about 400 people as well as 425 sheep and
620 cattle – an average of six sheep and nine cattle per household. Although we can
assume that some livestock had been brought from France, most of the animals must
have been purchased from New England. Investing in livestock made sense. They
could be put out to pasture on drained marshland (or along the edges of marshland)
long before the soil had desalinated enough to support crops. Livestock could be
moved if flooding, storms, or raiders threatened the farm. They provided meat, milk,
wool, and leather. If necessary, they could also be traded for other goods. Visiting in
1685, the vicar-general of New France, Saint-Vallier, noted that the secret to the
colonists’ relative comfort was their “bons et vastes pâturages.”39
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and Samantha Rompillon, «  Entre mythe et réalité : Beaubassin, miroir d’une communauté
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Not that these ideas were unique to the Acadians. In Concord, the first inland
settlement of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, the settlers arriving in the 1630s also
settled along salt marshes and river meadows. Emulating local Aboriginal people,
they built fish weirs, hunted waterfowl, and planted initial crops of corn, beans, and
squash on higher ground. In the meantime, they created a large meadow commons
by digging ditches and canals and connecting natural plains. This was a collective
effort: officials were appointed as early as 1644 to supervise the draining of the
“Great Meadow.” This commons supported vast livestock herds, which were the
main source of wealth for the colonists until they could clear uplands for the plough.
With each generation, new lands were drained and cleared so that Concord “filled
out and filled in” – creating diversified farms with pasture, cultivated fields,
gardens, and orchards. Brian Donahue’s conclusion could apply equally to colonists
in Concord or Acadia: “Maybe these people knew what they were doing.”40
The main difference in the early colonization of Acadia and Concord was that the
Port Royal region did not have large, centralized marshlands or meadows that could
support as many people. The Acadians later proved quite willing to work together in
larger groups where the terrain permitted, such as at Grand Pré. Indeed, another
important feature of the colonists’ organization was that even if their settlement
pattern was dispersed, they maintained community practices and institutions. The
church, the seigneury, and the market remained fundamental to rural life, while the
warehouses of English and, later, French goods at Port Royal provided
manufactured items the colonists could not make themselves in exchange for surplus
produce. After the French return in 1670, the Acadian heads of household, led by
their churchwarden Abraham Dugas, agreed to pool their resources to build a new
church.41 Although the seigneurial system had been disrupted by the English
takeover, it still functioned in the person of Alexandre LeBorgne de Belleisle for
Port Royal and Grand Pré and later in that of Michel LeNeuf de la Vallière for
Beaubassin. Documents reveal that LeBorgne continued to issue land grants and
collect rents, as did his widow Marie-Étienne de la Tour after his death.42
Perhaps most intriguing is Acadian adaptation of the parish assembly and
delegate (syndic), a longstanding rural institution.43 Heads of household in France,
and particularly in Poitou and Touraine, met to discuss important matters and elected
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a delegate to represent their interests in court or with state officials. The Acadians
did not lack for potential leaders. Menou had brought over several trusted men to
work with him, including the blacksmith Guillaume Trahan, the captain Germain
Doucet, and the surgeon Jacques Bourgeois. Trahan and Bourgeois signed the
capitulation to the English in 1654 on behalf of the colonists; Doucet had negotiated
the terms.44 Prominent artisans and merchants included Abraham Dugas and, later,
the brothers Charles and Pierre Melanson, while a number of patriarchs wielded
considerable authority. In France, the parish assembly supervised tax collection. In
Acadia, although there were no state taxes, there were plenty of other demands on
the population for supplies, troop billets, guides, and letter carriers.45 The delegates
could also serve as mediators for civil disputes among the habitants, and represented
their communities in official and legal matters. This was most famously done during
the 18th century with the negotiations over the oath of allegiance.
In Poitou, Robert and Siette were undertaking a vast, collective project that far
exceeded the ambitions of the colonists of either Acadia or Concord. They did not
have to worry about simple subsistence; they were planning a colonization project
that would add to their existing wealth and influence. In order to succeed, they knew
that they needed more than just land and royal assent; they required a team of
committed associates with the means and the patience to take on a long-term project.
They convinced both Jean Houefft, a wealthy Dutch financier and former associate
of Humphrey Bradley, and a group of local officials and seigneurs to join.46 One of
the latter was François Brisson, the seneschal of Fontenay-le-Comte, who proved
instrumental in arranging another and much larger property transaction, this time
with the abbot of Moreilles in 1642. The terms were virtually the same as those of
the original deal with the bishop of Maillezais (who happened to be the abbot’s
religious superior). In addition, the abbey received an annual fee of 1,000 livres and
a 50-hectare reserve of drained marshland for its own use. The associates agreed to
complete the work within four years.47 As a result of these two land deals, the
company gained a centralized, contiguous marshland territory of almost 6,400
hectares situated in four parishes: Chaillé-les-Marais, Saint-Radegonde-de-Noyers,
Puyravault and Champagné-les-Marais.48
Unlike the Acadians, who gradually drained marshland to meet their families’ needs,
the associates of the Petit-Poitou Company set out to drain all of their new marshland
territory right away. Four years later, they had largely succeeded. In October 1646, the
associates met at Fontenay-le-Comte to distribute this land and to establish the formal
statutes of their company. The allotment was carried out by lottery, with each associate
receiving a portion equivalent to their investment share (see Table 1).
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Table 1:
The associates or intéressés of the Petit-Poitou Company 
in 1646 in order of their share
Name Title Office Principal Residence Share
David de la Croix, — Conseiller du Roi La Rochelle 20.6%
Jean Hoeufft (de la Croix) (except Hoeufft, père,
père et fils Bergen-Op-Zoom)
Octavius de Strada Baron Auvergne 20.6%
d’Aubert
Pierre Siette Noble Ingénieur, géographe La Rochelle 11.0%
homme ordinaire du Roi
Charles de Flacourt, Noble Trésorier provincial de Fontenay-le-Comte 9.6%
Julien de Loynes homme l’extraordinaire des (Du Bois)
et Julien Du Bois guerres; conseiller,
secrétaire du Roi;
élu de Fontenay
Michel de Broc Chevalier, Anjou 7.2%
Baron de
Chemiré
Jacques Morienne Écuyer Receveur des tailles, Fontenay-le-Comte 5.6%
élection de Fontenay
François et Barnabé Écuyers, Sénéchal de Fontenay-le-Comte 4.6%
Brisson Sieurs Fontenay
Pierre Robert — Élu, élection de Fontenay-le-Comte 3.7%
Fontenay
Pierre Charrier Écuyer, Commissaire des Fontenay-le-Comte 3.5%
Sieur saisies réelles à
Fontenay
Louise de Bessay Dame 3.2%
de la Chevrotière, haute et
veuve Cailhaut, puissante
seigneur de
Montreuil
François Arrivé Sieur de Maître des Eaux-et- Chaillé-les-Marais 3.1%
Sableau Forêts, Fontenay
Pierre Turpault — Lieutenant ancien, Boulié (élection 2.5%
élection de Niort de Niort)
Jean et François Écuyers, 2.5%
de Mirande Sieurs
Marie Rouillaud, Dmlle Fontenay-le-Comte 1.0%
veuve Robert
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Name Title Office Principal Residence Share
Anne Braud, veuve Dame Fontenay-le-Comte 0.8%
Picard, seigneur
de Marans
Louis Robert — Fontenay-le-Comte 0.6%
Source: « Contrat de partage » , 22 mai 1646, série 135 J, Archives de la Société de
Petit-Poitou, Archives Départementales de la Vendée; Dienne, Histoire du
dessèchement, p. 91.
A slim majority stake in the Petit-Poitou Company was held by three investors:
Siette, Houefft’s group, and Octavius de Strada. The latter came from a prominent noble
family of the Holy Roman Empire and had moved to the Auvergne where he acquired
French nationality and the title of baron.49 The international character of this emerging
business is apparent in the bringing together of a Dutch financier, a German noble, and
a French engineer. Many failed or abortive companies, such as that of Bradley, had been
led by Dutch investors and other foreign interests, but what made the Petit-Poitou
Company unique was that it also had a strong base of local elites who had a direct and
long-term interest in the development of their lands and fortunes. Robert had brought
together a powerful group of the most prominent officials in Fontenay-le-Comte,
including himself and the alternate administrator of the élection, their chief tax collector,
the most important magistrate (the seneschal), and the head of the local department of
Waters and Forests. To this group of office-holders we can add several smaller local
landholders, including three widows. The local nature of the company is shown by the
fact that other than Hoeufft and Strada, only one other investor lived outside the region.50
This was Michel de Broc, a baron from Anjou, whose connection with the group formed
by Siette and Robert may have involved business ties to one or more of the investors.
Together, the investors of the Petit-Poitou company constituted a formidable base of
regional power led by a prestigious “Big Three” known in Paris and Versailles.
The company’s plan was to lease out large farms of drained marshlands called
cabanes (ironically, the same term used to describe Aboriginal shelters in New
France) to reliable tenants. This would become a consistent annual source of income
for the investors, especially since the terms of the lease made the tenants liable for
all taxes, seigneurial dues, and contributions to the company for upkeep and repair.
Despite these obligations, it seems that the company had good success in attracting
potential cabaniers. By the 1650s, local priests were reporting that 250 new families
had moved into their parishes, as much as doubling the population. They complained
about their increased workload and the refusal of the company’s tenants to pay the
tithe. In response, the company suggested that the bishop create two new parishes.51
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No doubt the 20-year tax relief awarded by Louis XIII was a powerful motivation
for migration. The company’s registers include many discussions about local
communities attempting to include company associates or their tenants on the parish
tax rolls and the associates’ legal procedures to prevent it.52
The local focus of the company is also apparent in the choice of Fontenay-le-Comte,
as opposed to Paris or La Rochelle, as the site of the first general assembly. The first
article of the statutes was that the assembly would be convoked every August to review
the books and discuss any business in detail.53 Only the assembly could set the annual
rate of contributions and approve the major works to be undertaken during the year. The
assembly also elected the company’s two most important officials: the director and the
master of dykes. The director served on an annual basis and was responsible for the
company’s finances and official books and papers, such as the register of assembly
minutes and records of agreements with local seigneurs. The director also represented
the company at any legal proceedings, and arbitrated disputes between associates
and/or tenants. He supervised the master of dykes and approved any minor or urgent
repairs needed during the year. It was a lot of work, which explains why the company
sometimes had difficulty finding a candidate for the position. Proving that he was not
merely a large investor but also an active member, Octavius de Strada was chosen as
the first director. The master of dykes was responsible for the weekly inspection of the
works, estimating the cost of any required repairs, and reporting these estimates and
other matters to the director. He also supervised any hired labour and ensured that they
carried out their duties. The master of dykes lived in the communal house of the
company and enjoyed an annual salary of 500 livres and a small pasture for his personal
use. For this position, which required technical knowledge and considerable energy, the
associates did not choose one of their own but hired a local estate manager, le Sieur de
la Maisonneuve, who served the company for many years.
The statutes also laid out expectations for the tenant farmers who would be doing
the cultivation. The associates were to ensure that their leases covered the
seigneurial dues and annual contributions required for the company. The tenants
could be called upon for emergency repairs, and had to maintain tools and stockpiles
of dirt for common tasks such as shoring up dykes. They were not to cut the dykes
or to obstruct the water system with overlarge fishing nets. They had to keep their
livestock under strict control; the beasts could not be allowed to drink from the
canals or to harm the dykes or the roads. The company’s deliberations indicate that
such damages were a recurring and sometimes serious problem, and tenants were
encouraged to denounce any of their number who violated the statutes. In 1651,
widespread and accumulated damages were reported as a result of tenants throwing
refuse and dirt in the canals, planting trees on the dykes, and letting their livestock
roam freely. Two years later, the general assembly declared that all tenants would be
responsible for any damages they caused – either having to carry out repairs
themselves or paying for the work.54
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In general, the organizational model of the Petit-Poitou Company combined a
traditional vision of rural socioeconomic hierarchy, featuring landowners and tenant
farmers, with a new commercial approach centred on associates investing,
deliberating, and working together. It was a collective project that sought to create a
new colony of leaseholders in the middle of old France. The particular success of
Petit-Poitou can be attributed to its strong investor base as well as its systematic
approach: securing land and royal approval, carrying out the major works,
distributing the resulting arable land, and establishing simple and clear statutes.
Comparing the organizational models for marshland development in Acadia and
Poitou, both projects featured a general assembly that united the principal
stakeholders and elected a chief representative. In Acadia this was a community
institution that technically included all heads of household, although it was likely
dominated by wealthier and more established members.55 The assembly tended to be
limited to political matters, since each member was his own proprietor. In the Petit-
Poitou Company the general assembly was composed only of the landlords and did
not include the tenant farmers, who rented the cabanes. Nevertheless, the assembly
maintained considerable control over agricultural production. It designed the dyke
system, it contracted and paid the workers who implemented it as well as the
officials who ran it, and it imposed limitations and rules for the use of the land once
drained. In short, the general assembly of Petit-Poitou exercised a much wider direct
jurisdiction over the community. No doubt the interests of the state would have been
well served by having for Acadia a colonization company like that of Petit-Poitou,
with its strong investment base, management capability, and its ability to generate
profits. The arrival of 250 families in less than ten years far exceeded the settlement
results at Port Royal; even Charles de Menou had managed to entice, at most, 50
families. The less-contiguous marshlands, however, and the ongoing political
instability made such a project difficult to realize or even conceptualize in practice.
As for the colonists themselves, there was little incentive for them to embark on
larger draining or clearing projects.
Methods
Colonization projects in Acadia and Poitou had very different scopes, but in their
basic techniques they were similar.56 There were dykes to keep exterior waters out,
canals to move interior waters seawards and a mechanism to make sure that water
did not surge back into the drained area during high tides or flooding. But particular
adaptations were developed in response to the very different environmental
conditions in the two areas.
The Poitevin Marsh was a vast, humid zone of some 75,000 hectares between the
Loire and the Gironde rivers, centred on another major river and its tributaries, the
Sèvre Niortaise.57 Composed of three principal basins, the Lay, the Vendée, and the
Autize, the region was on average one to three metres below sea level, although
limestone outcroppings and the accumulation of sedimentation created many
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“islands” of higher ground which had been densely occupied since the medieval
period.58 Most of the marshland was considerably inland from the ocean, meaning that
the principal challenge was draining the existing water out and protecting the resultant
arable land from winter and spring flooding. Coastal areas faced an average high tide
of four metres. The Acadian marshlands, by contrast, were only about one-quarter the
size of those of Poitou, some 20,000 hectares, and they were widely dispersed around
the coast of the Bay of Fundy.59 One exception was at Grand Pré, where the Acadians
worked collectively to drain a relatively large area (although this was broken up into
several sub-projects over 70 years).60 While some Acadians expanded further inland
along the rivers that fed into the bay, the majority of their hameaux remained close to
the coast and thus were directly exposed to the Bay of Fundy’s tides – the highest in
the world. The challenge was therefore how to protect the dyked land from the tides.
In the Minas Basin, for example, some four cubic miles of water, weighing 14 billion
tons, entered and exited the area every 12.5 hours. At Port Royal, the tides were not as
strong but still could reach heights of over eight metres and thus posed a considerable
threat to dykes.61 The marshlands themselves were composed of deep marine soils;
experts estimate that the Acadians would have needed to wait as long as five years to
begin cultivation due to the concentration of salt.62
Although some of the Acadian colonists may have been familiar with marshlands
in Poitou, it is likely that most had to be taught how to drain and maintain marshland
farms at first. By 1650, however, they were no longer dependent on outside expertise
or leadership. They no doubt refined their skills with practice and through
discussions with neighbours. They also would have had to work with their
neighbours to ensure that their dykes and canals eventually connected. As the
population grew, the amount of marshland reclaimed grew as well; it was a project
in constant evolution, moving at a speed defined by life course.63 This gradual
approach partially explains why, as late as 1707, the vast majority of Acadian
households still cultivated less than five hectares, less than ten per cent of the land
cultivated by a typical cabanier of Petit-Poitou. Attacks from raiders and the lack of
available markets to sell surpluses contributed to these modest results. Using the
1707 census and estimating crop returns and consumption rates, we can determine
that at least a third of Acadian households in 1707 did not grow enough food to meet
their family’s needs and instead seemed to rely on trade or artisanal activity.64
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Several recent studies bear on how Acadians drained and maintained their lands.
The process began with the perimeter dyke or levée, which was two metres wide at
the top and ten to fifteen metres wide at its base, and as much as ten feet high
depending on how exposed it was to the tides. These dykes had a strong centre of
compacted dirt and marsh grass, often including a series of wooden posts, and were
covered by cut sods with root systems that gradually grew together for further
reinforcement.65 A series of canals and ditches were also dug in order to move water
out. Given that the dyke’s principal role was to protect against the tides, the Acadians
needed to find a way for water to pass through the dyke without giving the tides the
opportunity to send the water rushing back in and also without sapping the strength
of the dyke. The answer was the aboiteau. The Acadians identified where the natural
stream flowed and built a large sluice box of wood, usually from a hollowed out tree
trunk. In the centre of this box, they placed a clapet or valve which opened to let water
out during low tide and closed to block water from going back into the marshland
during high tide. In places of particularly high water flow, such as a major creek or
stream, the box might be made with two or three lanes, each with its own clapet. The
dykes were then built on top of the box. Having exited the cleared area through the
aboiteau, the water then flowed through the exterior canal towards the sea.66
In Poitou, the first attempts to use the marshlands for agriculture dated from early
medieval times, although they were interrupted by the Hundred Years’ War and
especially the Wars of Religion. For example, several abbeys worked together
during the 13th century to build an 11-kilometre long canal (appropriately dubbed
the Canal of the Five Abbots) that carried away excess water and created livestock
pasture.67 The existing structures gave the Petit-Poitou Company an advantage; this
was especially true of the Achenal du Roi, which was incorporated into the new
“Dutch belt” – a large perimeter dyke that enclosed about one-half of the marshland
to be cleared along its northern frontier – protecting it from water flowing toward
the ocean, particularly via the Vendée.68 This dyke was roughly the same width as
those built in Acadia, as much as twelve meters at its base, but at a little over two
meters at its summit it was not nearly as high. It began just south of Luçon and
moved in an arc to a point southwest of Fontenay-le-Comte, a distance of nearly 25
kilometres. Next the company dug two large canals, called the Clain and the Vienne,
in order to evacuate the excess water from the now-enclosed area toward the
confluence of the Vendée and the Sèvre, from which it flowed out to sea.69
Construction of a series of smaller canals and dykes followed, in order to move
water and protect from flooding throughout the area. The typical construct was a
dyke (called a “bot”), with a canal on the interior side (a “contrebot”) and a wide
ditch on the exterior side (called an “achenal”) and which guided external water away
from the dyke towards the river and also served to protect the dyke from wandering
livestock. The main construction was completed during the first four years and
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followed strict mathematical parameters. For example, each square league (about 16
square kilometres) had its own perimeter dyke and its own grid of canals and ditches
creating 32 farms (cabanes) of about 50 hectares each.70
Of course, water levels and movement were not consistent throughout the year,
so the company employed a series of “doors” (or “portes”) to control the flow. The
first models had again been developed during the 13th century, but Dutch ingenuity
led to improvements and adaptations. Many canals ended with portereaux; these
were essentially clapets that responded to water pressure, opening to release excess
water, but closing should flooding or tides try to push water back in, much like
Acadian aboiteaux. The rivers themselves were increasingly controlled with
installed sluice gates called écluses, because the effort to evacuate the water from
the marshlands could cause flooding over their natural banks. The doors consisted
of a large gate that could be raised by a winch mechanism to block the water from
flowing downstream, or lowered to allow it to continue. This engineering
culminated in the large doors built where the water met the sea. Suspended between
two tall stone columns were two doors several metres tall. The doors were hinged
on the sides and were opened to allow the water to flow out during low tide, and
closed during high tide to prevent salt water from pushing back upriver.71 The
écluses and the final doors at the sea had to be manually opened and closed, and for
this the Petit-Poitou Company hired portiers who were responsible to maintain them
in good working order and operate them under the direction of the master of dykes.72
In fact, the company was so successful in evacuating water from the marshlands
that it inadvertently could cause drought if the summer was dry; this would force it
to reverse the drainage process in order to draw water in, retaining it in the rivers
and canals with the écluses. Not surprisingly, these transformations could lead to
disputes between neighbours. Nearby parishes protested the flooding and droughts
caused to their arable land and pasture.73 In 1655 the Abbot of Moreilles complained
of flooding caused by a poorly placed clapet, while the head cleric of the
commanderie at Puyravault disputed the company’s right to dig canals and obstruct
the natural passage of local streams. In 1658 a rival company’s dykes threatened to
re-direct water back onto the marshlands of Petit-Poitou. In 1679 an ongoing dispute
with the inhabitants of Chaillé-les-Marais culminated in the sabotage of the
company’s perimeter dyke.74
In Acadian cultural memory, the aboiteau has attained a prominent position. For
Yves Cormier it was a unique invention, a key foundation of Acadian identity and a
“continual source of inspiration.” Ronnie-Gilles LeBlanc emphasizes that the term
came to represent the entire dyke and sluice system used by the Acadians and was
symbolic of the cultural heritage of the Acadian community.75 Yet the principle of
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using mechanisms and water pressure to control water flow was also widespread in
Poitou, and dated back to the medieval period. We know that experts were hired to
help set up marshland development at Port Royal in the 1630s. We can further
speculate that some of the original colonists, many of whom came from the larger
region of Poitou, Aunis, and Saintonge, would have had a prior knowledge of these
techniques.76 There is an apparent similarity between French salt-making spades and
the typical Acadian dyking spade. Even the term “aboteau” was well known in the
Poitevin Marsh, although it seems to have had a different meaning.77 Closely
associated with the “bot” or dyke, aboteaux were small obstacles and barrages
constructed in the canals to divert or slow down water flow and thereby assist the
dykes. Sometimes, these works of wood, dirt, and other materials became
impromptu fishing platforms and traps, a source of frustration for the general
assembly of the Petit-Poitou Company.78 However, by the end of the 17th century, it
seems that the company was using the word in the Acadian sense of a water-flow
control mechanism. For example, the master of dykes was working on the building
of an “abotteau” at the point where the Canal de la Vienne met the river specifically
in order to better protect the drained marshland from water returning during high
tide.79 This suggests that not only was there an adaptation of proven techniques
between Poitou and Acadia at the beginning of the 17th century, but that there was
also an ongoing transmission of knowledge – both from the Old World to New
World and vice versa – that influenced the evolution of those techniques.
Many artists and historians have idealized the collective spirit of the Acadians:
Thus dwelt together in love these simple Acadian farmers –
Dwelt in the love of God and of man. Alike were they free from
Fear that reigns with the tyrant, and envy the vice of republics
Neither locks had they to their doors, nor bars to their windows;
But their dwellings were open as day and the hearts of the owners;
There the richest was poor, and the poorest lived in abundance.80
While community support was important, we should not exaggerate the degree to
which everyone worked together to build aboiteaux, construct dykes, and dig ditches.81
There is no doubt that often people pitched in to help get a newly married couple
started or to carry out needed maintenance on a key stretch of dyke that impacted
multiple fields. We can imagine a robust community response when storms or enemy
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raids breached the levées. But, in general, it is far more likely that the routine work
was conducted by family groups – neighbours and relatives who lived closely together
and depended on each other. Sherman Bleakney, writing about Grand Pré, has
effectively de-mystified Acadian dyking, arguing that small teams of six to eight
young men working under the supervision of a single expert could have effectively
carried out the initial work and that such teams would have been hired out by families
as needed.82 Simply put, the dispersion of the Acadians along the rivers and the modest
size of their farms made a large-scale, collective approach unnecessary.
The centralization and close proximity of Petit-Poitou’s farms meant that there
was a collective will and effort to inspect, maintain, and repair all of the
constructions. For example, just two years after its completion, the general assembly
noted that extensive work was needed on the Canal du Clain. A similar
reconstruction project was required for the Canal de la Vienne in 1655.83 In the
winter of 1657, the perimeter dykes were breached by unusually severe flooding.
The situation was so bad that many tenant farmers lost their livestock and abandoned
their farms, obliging the associates to come up with 4,000 livres tournois (lt) for
emergency repairs. And in 1659 the house of the portier for the Canal du Clain
collapsed and had to be replaced.84 In fact, the register is full of references to specific
work needed to repair or replace dykes, canals, écluses, and other portes. It was
carried out by watchmen appointed by the master of dykes, who were paid from 10
to 40 lt each year.85 It was not easy work, especially as many tenants simply ignored
the statute prohibiting livestock from being allowed near the dykes and threatened
the watchmen if they tried to intervene. In 1676 the general assembly ruled that their
officials would be armed and authorized to shoot the offending livestock. This was
softened by 1678 to simply confiscating the beasts, with the associates vowing to
prosecute those causing violence. In 1687 a lawsuit was launched against a perennial
offender, Simon Bennoteau.86 Such measures do not seem to have ended the
problem, as one lax watchman was replaced and an additional one hired to deal with
the workload in 1692. In addition, the director offered a bounty of one écu for each
head of livestock seized for trespassing on the dykes.87
Surveillance, maintenance, and repair were constant and expensive tasks. Every
year, the general assembly identified a rate of “contributions” for upkeep. Company
records reveal that, not surprisingly, the first years were the most costly: 15
sous(s)/arpent in 1647, 10 in 1648, and the highest level, 20, in 1649. Over the first
50 years of the company (1647-1696), however, the rate of contributions averaged
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just 7.5 s per arpent (.375 lt), while the land was evaluated in 1658 as being worth
75 lt per arpent.88 Thus, the contribution rate was a mere fraction of the land’s value
(0.05 per cent); the contribution rate for a typical cabane of 50 hectares in an average
year, for instance, would have been only 56 lt. Of course, the leaseholders who
actually paid the contributions did not own the land, so the proportional burden on
them was higher. Notary records from the beginning of the 18th century suggest that
a typical cabane leased for about 500 lt, making the average annual levy a little more
than ten per cent of this sum.89 There is also great diversity among the leases and sub-
leases in the records. One set of five leases from July 1701 demonstrates that choice
pieces of land could cost much more, even twice the standard rate.90 The company’s
minutes occasionally mention difficulties in collecting the annual contributions on
time. In 1655 some associates at the general assembly complained that this was
damaging to those who did pay on time and threatened the future of the whole project.
The general assembly moved that the director had no discretion to make alternate
arrangements or permit delays in payments, suggesting that a number of side deals and
dispensations had been going on. Notwithstanding, the next year the director reported
a shortage of money because many had still not paid up. Again, in 1677, the general
assembly called for diligence in collecting outstanding contributions.91 A 1717 budget
suggests that the situation had improved, as just eight per cent of the company’s
tenants appear significantly behind on their contributions.92
While Acadian colonists built dykes and dug ditches themselves, the landlords of
the Petit-Poitou Company hired engineers, artisans, and lots of local labour to carry
out the initial constructions. With regard to maintenance and repairs, a typical lease
included a provision that tenants must leave the farm in the same state in which they
found it; the general assembly also declared that tenants were responsible to fix any
damage caused by their livestock.93 Landlords arranged periodic inspections to
ensure that tenants were living up to their part of the bargain. The tenant farmers,
however, were not trusted to maintain and repair the company’s water management
system. In Acadia, a breach might affect a small group of families, but in Petit-
Poitou, a single breach could devastate a large area. Thus, the landlords sought to
protect their investment by organizing all of the work under the master of dykes. In
1659, for example, 2,000 lt was due to the company’s hired workforce. Often the
director paid up front, either with his own or borrowed money. The budget of 1677
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shows that the director and the master of dykes had put up about 2,250 lt between
them, and an additional 950 lt was now required to pay for the work and construction
materials needed to repair several canals, a large dyke, and a bridge.94 All of this was
no doubt a significant benefit to the local economy. Some workers formed
“brigades” that specialized in marshland work and negotiated contract prices with
the various spin-off and new companies directly. In 1704, for example, the director
of the Petit-Poitou Company signed a contract with a team of three workers to repair
and enlarge part of the Canal du Clain. The pay was 20 sous for each toise (about 2
metres) completed.95 The work would be inspected before the workers would be
paid, but it is likely that they did their best so that they would be re-hired in the
future. The establishment of one hundred large farms in Poitou, of course, also
created a need for permanent and seasonal farm labourers.
This review of the techniques employed to colonize marshlands in Acadia and
Poitou reveals many similarities and common principles. The chief differences lay
in available capital, how the work was organized, and in the specific configuration
of the dykes and water flow mechanisms. While Acadian families took care of their
own work for their own needs, the Petit-Poitou Company undertook a huge
development project – draining virtually its entire marshland territory in four short
years and centrally managing ongoing repairs and maintenance through hired labour.
Aboiteaux functioned automatically (although they no doubt had to be inspected
regularly) in conjunction with the tides to drain and protect marshland in Acadia,
while a combination of automatic mechanisms and manually operated doors
controlled water levels in Poitou in relation to seasonal precipitation and river flow.
Results
Neither the Acadians nor the Petit-Poitou Company created marshland farms on a
blank slate; others already lived there. Colonization brought displacement of these
original occupants. At first, the relationship between the Acadians and local Aboriginal
peoples, most notably the Mi’kmaq, was quite positive. It is clear that the friendship
of sagamos such as Membertou was instrumental to the success of the first years of
Port Royal, and there were a number of marriages and less formal relationships
between early colonists and Aboriginal women.96 In general, the Mi’kmaq were not
overly disrupted by the presence of small groups of farmers in the marshlands and
some apparently valued the opportunity to trade. In fact, most Acadian communities
were started near Mi’kmaw villages and several Aboriginal families were still living
near Port Royal as late as 1708.97 As the Acadian population expanded, though, so did
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its impact on the environment and its draw on natural resources. Marshland drainage
made the land good for agriculture, but less attractive for hunting, fishing, and
gathering – introducing tensions with local Mi’kmaq for whom the marshlands were
part of a traditional economy.98 Further, as beaver populations dwindled due to
overhunting, trade between Aboriginal and Acadian inhabitants diminished while the
expansion of the colonial population reduced the number of cases of métissage.
The process of Mi’kmaw displacement was very gradual and caused by many
other factors than just marshland colonization. Given the small size of both the
Acadian and the Mi’kmaw population in the area around Port Royal, it is hard to
believe that competition for resources became intense. Instead, disease and war
probably played the greatest role in motivating many Aboriginal inhabitants to move
away. While it is hard to determine precise figures, even conservative estimates
suggest that the Mi’kmaw population diminished by three-quarters between 1500
and 1700.99 After the British Conquest it is not surprising that Aboriginal families
would have avoided the area around Annapolis Royal, which increasingly became a
British garrison town. The displacement was not direct nor imposed militarily, since
neither the Acadians nor the British possessed the power to force the Mi’kmaq to do
anything.100 What we can say is that – especially after 1710 – the Mi’kmaw presence
in the Port Royal area was greatly reduced, partly through demographic decline and
partly through migration, as evidenced in the gradual disappearance of Aboriginal
people from the Annapolis Royal parish register.101
In Poitou, large areas of the marshland remained undeveloped during the
medieval period and were inhabited by “Maraîchins” or, more pejoratively, hut-
dwellers (“huttiers”). These families made their living by fishing, hunting, gathering
wood, and maintaining small gardens and troops of livestock. Some served as
boatmen and guides for people travelling through the marsh. By contemporary
standards, they were quite poor.102 The average taille assessment on marshland
parishes in 1631 was just 3.4 lt per household, whereas in 1698 the developed
marshland areas averaged 15 to 20 lt per household. The environmental
transformation carried out by the associates pushed the maraîchin way of life to the
periphery. Some were also “co-opted” by the company, hired as watchmen and
portiers for key installations. For example, the spin-off company of Vix, Maillezais,
and Maillé created three such posts: one for its aqueduct, one for its principal bridge,
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and one for the main doors at the sea.103 These huttiers simply moved their rude
shelters to the nearest dyke to live and work there, receiving in return a small stipend
and the right to fish in nearby canals. This story of displacement is eerily similar to
that of American Aboriginal peoples. In fact, Éric Rousseaux deliberately chooses the
term “autochtone” to describe the circumstances of the Maraîchins.104 There are
limits, of course, to this comparison; Poitevin “Aboriginals” shared the same religion
and worldview as the colonizers and did not suffer the devastating consequences of
new epidemic diseases. In addition, their displacement occurred quickly whereas that
of the Mi’kmaq was more gradual – not least because their traditional economy was
not entirely based on fishing and gathering in marshlands and because they retained
significant military power at least until the mid-18th century.
The human and ecological costs of colonization are important, but the results of
these projects must also be evaluated against their objectives. The landlords of the
Petit-Poitou Company aimed to create and maintain landed income through the
rental of marshland farms. The families of Port Royal needed to meet the immediate
needs of their families but also wished to establish themselves and their children
over the long-term, improving their standard of living. Were they successful?
In Acadia, the high rate of population growth in the colony has been well known
to historians for some time.105 This general trend, however, hides some important
nuances for the second half of the 17th century. In 1671 the Acadian population was
still almost entirely based in the area of Port Royal and comprised 66 families and
about 400 people. By 1686, Port Royal had grown to 95 families and about 600
people. At the turn of the century, however, the number of inhabitants had
diminished to around 500 people. We know that some, especially young married
couples, were moving away to Grand Pré and Beaubassin during this time,
continuing the migration trend that their parents had begun during the 1650s.106
Furthermore, the period between 1690 and 1710 was particularly difficult in Acadia.
Cold winters, drought, storms, and even a hurricane struck the region. Dykes were
breached and famine ensued. In addition, English attacks on Port Royal in 1690,
1707, and 1710 caused further damage and misery. And those who had moved away
did not escape the violence, for Beaubassin was attacked in 1696 and both
Beaubassin and Grand Pré suffered in 1704. All of this slowed the rate of Acadian
population growth considerably.107
English raiders in the 1690s and 1700s deliberately targeted the dykes. We can
see the impact in the amount of land cultivated by the Acadians: from 377 arpents
(129 hectares) in 1686 to only 393 arpents (134 hectares) 20 years later. If the
colonists had lived in more centralized villages, it is likely that such raids would
have been even more devastating. Dispersed as they were, a breach caused by a
storm or a raid would not destroy the entire harvest and the community could come
to the aid of the hardest-hit. In addition, the Acadians continued to focus on
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livestock. By 1707, there was an average of nine cattle, twelve sheep, and nine pigs
for each family.108 More easily protected from raids and storms, livestock was also
increasingly in demand in places such as Boston and, later, Louisbourg.
To measure the true potential of this colonization project, we need to look
forward to the 18th century – when peace enabled the Acadians to flourish in what
Naomi Griffiths has dubbed their “Golden Age.”109 The archaeological record
demonstrates that the Acadians profited greatly from this period of peace, building
larger and better houses on stone foundations, cultivating more land, and expanding
their herds. We can assume the relative health of the population from the low rate of
child mortality. In the region of now-renamed Annapolis Royal, the population grew
to about 900 by 1730 and to 2,000 by 1755.110 New communities sprang up around
the Bay of Fundy. But the peace was of short duration, as imperial wars resumed in
the 1740s and culminated in the Deportation.
A detailed budget in 1717 enables us to consider the financial success and
viability of the Petit-Poitou Company after its initial period of investment and
consolidation (see Figure 1). It posted a small deficit of 430 lt for that year, with total
revenue of 10,847 lt and total expenses of 11,277 lt. With 101 cabanes, 93 of which
were on active leases, the company was cultivating most of its territory. Annual
contributions, which generated just short of 7,400 lt in revenue, covered the work
receipts and the salaries of the officials. A particularly large contract of 1,215 lt for
the repair of the perimeter dykes was arranged with a team of workers at the rate of
12 s/toise (about 6 s/metre).111
The company’s other expenses included seigneurial dues, the salaries of its
employees (the director, the master of dykes, watchmen, and portiers), and diverse
costs such as stationery and courier fees. Legal fees – to pay lawyers, courts, and
“advisors” (which we might assume means patrons) – represented a substantial set
of expenses as the company continued to defend its property rights against rival
companies, local communities, and seigneurs. At more than 1,000 lt, these expenses
made up 11 per cent of the annual outlay. The budget mentions a receipt from a
previous year’s payment of 1,800 lt to a single lawyer for his “services.” These
ongoing procedures clearly cost time and money, raising the contribution rate for the
company’s tenants. That said, the balance sheet is almost even, including taking into
account outstanding contributions and debts from previous years. This suggests that
the company was quite adept at financial planning, setting the rate of annual
contributions at just the right level. It also demonstrates that the intent was not for
the company itself to make money; its goal was to break even so that its individual
members could profit from selling leases on their properties.
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Figure 1:
Expenses of the Petit-Poitou Company, 1717
Source: Budget, 17 août 1717, série 135 J, Archives de la Société de Petit-Poitou,
Archives Départementales de la Vendée.
We already know that the ideal cabane was about 50 hectares (150 arpents),
though in fact they could vary in size from just a few hectares to more than 270.
Many cabaniers were local, established ploughmen who resided in nearby parishes.
These were the better-off peasants who could raise the money or credit to take on a
lease, and who could be trusted to take proper care of the land. The overall
impression is one of considerable work and obligation, but also of comfortable
living. Perhaps the greatest advantage to these properties was that they were large,
concentrated parcels of fertile land at a time when most peasants cultivated
numerous small strips across several parishes and seigneuries. Taking up residence
in a new marshland farm would have been a significant step up the socioeconomic
ladder. Typically, two-thirds of the arable land was planted in wheat, barley, and rye
while the remaining third was pasture. Only in the mid-18th century did crop
rotation and fallowing become common, as the fertility of the soils gradually waned
from constant exploitation.112 The probate inventory of a typical cabanier, Jean
Morriset, demonstrates that livestock were also important to marshland farming in
Poitou – the beasts were often leased from the landlord for a split in the profits.
Morriset’s harvested crops had an estimated value of 440 lt, but the livestock of the
farm was worth almost four times as much at 1,710 lt.113 Given the large numbers of
animals maintained in the pasture – in this case, 24 oxen, cows, and bulls as well as
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37 sheep – it is not surprising that the depredations of livestock were frequently
discussed at the company’s general assembly. Animals were at once the farms’
greatest asset and greatest menace. As in Acadia, cleared marshlands proved ideal
for pasturing livestock and the beasts were an excellent investment and safeguard
against crop failures.
In general, the Petit-Poitou Company did not have to contend with the same kind
of political instability and warfare that had such serious consequences in Acadia.
There was, however, one case of heavy-handed state intervention. In 1685, Louis
XIV ordered the confiscation of all Dutch property in his kingdom. This included
virtually all of the succession of Jean Hoeufft and also that of Octavius de Strada,
who had married into the Hoeufft family and left no heirs of his own. Together, these
farms constituted about 30 per cent of the total – less than Houefft’s and Strada’s
original stake of 40 per cent – but still by far the largest portions. The king gifted
these properties to the Duc de Guiche, who continued to sell leases to tenant farmers
through local tax-collectors. It was a rich prize for a royal favourite.114 The
documents also indicate that developed marshland property value remained high,
keeping pace with and surpassing inflation. Some large farms of 200 arpents were
leased for as much as 1,000 lt each year.115 Of course, this intervention did not
disrupt the company greatly; the duke simply became one of the principal investors
and some of the property was eventually returned in 1713.116
In general, the company had succeeded in creating a stable and lucrative landed
income for its associates. Its success may best be measured by the imitations of
others. Spin-off companies and emulators soon appeared throughout the marshlands
of western France, explicitly starting with the organizational model and statutes of
Petit-Poitou and then adapting them to their own situations.117 Unlike Acadia, Petit-
Poitou benefited from peace and stability. If the area had been subject to repeated
raids and extensive damages, would the company have folded (as every New World
company seemed to do)? Would investors have searched elsewhere for less risky
opportunities? There were a few examples of associates who invested in colonization
projects both in the Poitevin Marsh and in the New World.118 But these men were
exceptional; it is likely that such hardships in Poitou would have significantly limited
marshland development, just as they had during the Wars of Religion.
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At first glance, it may seem difficult to compare the results of these projects
because their scales and ambitions were so different. In four short years, a group of
investors in France drained an area equivalent to that drained by the entire Acadian
population over the course of a century. Yet both the settler families of Acadia and
the landlords of the Petit-Poitou Company were successful in achieving their
particular goals, and this success can be attributed to a number of common themes.
Their farms were productive and diversified, with livestock occupying a central role.
Commerce flourished. The relatively high standard of living on marshland farms
supported a significant rate of population increase. Solidarity among the principal
stakeholders ensured that the projects could persevere, despite war and political
instability in the case of Port Royal or legal and fiscal challenges in the case of Petit-
Poitou.
Conclusion
Colonizing marshlands was not a new idea in the mid-17th century, but the French
state had proved incapable of sustaining projects at home or in the New World.
Where kings and ministers had failed, local groups in Acadia and Poitou adapted old
methods and developed new organizational models. In the vicinity of Port Royal,
Acadians drained enough marshland to survive at first in small groups of families
connected by kinship as well as common origins and interests. Once established,
they expanded in order to ensure they had enough to sustain their growing families
and to develop an enhanced standard of living through trade. They learned and
adapted basic methods of water management that had long been in use in France to
fit the particular geography and settlement pattern of the colony.119 Meanwhile, the
Petit-Poitou Company launched a bold initiative to utterly transform a large,
centralized area of marshland. Its founders secured rights to the land and royal
privileges, and enticed wealthy financiers and local officials to join. Together, they
planned the necessary constructions rigorously, and carried them out in just four
years. They then divided the reclaimed land in accordance with their shares and
proceeded to lease out large farms to trustworthy ploughmen. Year after year, these
leases provided a lucrative income to the landowners and a solid living for the
tenants and seasonal labourers under the watchful eye of the general assembly and
its leaders.
Moreover, a wider comparison is revealing. As we have seen, many communities
in northeastern North America relied at least in part on marshlands – emulating
Aboriginal people in their hunting, fishing, and gathering while adding their own
practice of pasturing livestock. In the St. Lawrence Valley, New Netherlands, and
New England, salt marshes were used for pasture, forage, thatch, peat, and fertilizer.
Nor were the Acadians the only colonists to transform marshes into arable land.
From 17th-century Concord to 19th-century Kamouraska, drainage schemes created
new farms.120 Similarly, the associates of the Petit-Poitou Company were certainly
not the only proprietors who had the notion of getting rich through investing in
marshland development. From the 17th century fens of East Anglia to the 19th
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00156-02 Kennedy Article_Layout  2013-04-16  9:46 AM  Page 64
century Grande Prairie of East-Central Illinois, landlords leased out newly drained
marshland farms to tenants for considerable sums.121
How distinctive, then, was Acadian marshland colonization? First, most settler
groups in the Northeast hunted, fished, and foraged in salt marshes and also used
them for pasture, but preferred clearing uplands for their arable lands. While new
research has suggested that the Acadians may have cleared more upland than
previously thought, especially during the 18th century, their long-term focus on
marshland cultivation was unusual.122 Second, this was one of the few significant
drainage projects that was not centrally managed or funded by substantial capital
investment. The settlers of Concord also drained marshland on their own initiative,
but they did it collectively, ultimately parcelling out pieces of the resulting “Great
Meadow” just as the associates of the Petit-Poitou Company divided up the territory
they had reclaimed. The Acadians proved that draining marshland was possible on a
small scale and under local control.123 They lacked the resources and the motivation
to clear a large area all at once. Their approach also helped maintain longer positive
relations with local Aboriginal people, who outnumbered them greatly during the
17th century. Other marshland colonization projects, because of the speed and size
of their initiative, involved the rapid displacement of the indigenous population.
Finally, the use of the aboiteau – an automatic mechanism that worked with the tides
to control water levels – was essential. It must be stressed that this was not a unique
Acadian invention, although the colonists adapted a Poitevin word for a simple
barrage. In fact, the Petit-Poitou Company constructed in many canals portereaux
that also performed automatically with a clapet responding to water pressure.
Elsewhere, however, they used manually operated doors because the threat of
flooding was seasonal and a few key installations along the major rivers could
protect most of the reclaimed land. This was also about control, as the company
hired its own agents to manage and protect its territory and could shut the doors to
keep water in if necessary. What was distinctive in Acadia was how each farm had
to have its own “portes” in order to make dispersed marshland farming possible, and
how the particular nature of the tides and the lack of available labour made
automatic mechanisms embedded in the dykes the most practical solution.
The study of these projects also contributes to the larger history of colonization
in the Atlantic World. By employing comparative approaches we can avoid
ethnocentrism and identify trends, distinctions, and the transmission of ideas and
knowledge from one group to another. Both projects also buttress the general
conclusion of environmental historians that colonization was in large part motivated
by demographic pressures. In Acadia this connection is obvious, as families drained
marshlands gradually in conjunction with their needs and those of their offspring. In
Poitou, the willingness of 250 peasant families to buy the leases to new marshland
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farms, as well as the steadily rising value of those farms by the early 18th century,
demonstrate the high demand for productive farmland in western France. Finally,
this study supports the important distinction that “colonization and empire-building
were not the same process, and at times they could come in conflict.”124 The French
state was incapable of leading colonization efforts at home and abroad for most of
the 17th century. Colonization was just one of many methods for kings, ministers,
and great nobles to gain influence and prestige. For these individuals, mired in
constant rivalry and competition, what counted was less the actual development of
a colony and more the rights and privileges that possession of a colony entailed. As
one historian has observed, the Acadia that “existed in the minds of diplomats and
governors” was not the same as the Acadia “created by the colonists.”125 The
examples of both Acadia and the Petit-Poitou Company suggest that successful,
sustainable colonization was a profoundly local endeavour.
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